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Recent research on human agency suggests that intentional causation is associated with
a subjective compression in the temporal interval between actions and their effects. That
is, intentional movements and their causal effects are perceived as closer together in time
than equivalent unintentional movements and their causal effects. This so-called inten-
tional binding effect is consistently found for one’s own self-generated actions. It has also
been suggested that intentional binding occurs when observing intentional movements
of others. However, this evidence is undermined by limitations of the paradigm used. In
the current study we aimed to overcome these limitations using a more rigorous design
in combination with functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to explore the neural
underpinnings of intentional binding of observed movements. In particular, we aimed to
identify brain areas sensitive to the interaction between intentionality and causality attrib-
uted to the observed action. Our behavioral results confirmed the occurrence of intentional
binding for observed movements using this more rigorous paradigm. Our fMRI results high-
lighted a collection of brain regions whose activity was sensitive to the interaction between
intentionality and causation. Intriguingly, these brain regions have previously been impli-
cated in the sense of agency over one’s own movements. We discuss the implications of
these results for intentional binding specifically, and the sense of agency more generally.
Keywords: agency, causality, intention, mental-state attribution, intentional binding, consciousness, fMRI, social
perception
INTRODUCTION
Hume famously argued that causality cannot be perceived directly
but must be inferred based on certain cues such as the temporal
contiguity of events (Hume, 1739/1888). According to this view,
time provides the bottom-up perceptual input to the formation
of higher-level causal representations. Intriguingly, more recent
research on human agency implies that the reverse relationship
also exists, i.e., a belief about a causal relationship between two
events alters the temporal experience of those events by top-down
modulation. In particular, it has been demonstrated that, when
an agent is (or believes she is) the cause of an event, this causal
representation can shape the way in which the timing of actions
and outcomes are perceived: intentional actions, such as an active
key press, and their effects, such as a tone, are perceived as closer
together in time than equivalent unintentional (passive) move-
ments and their effects (Haggard et al., 2002; Moore and Obhi,
2012). The existence of this “intentional binding” effect indicates
that intentional causation is associated with the subjective bind-
ing together in time of actions and their effects. Although this
intentional binding effect has been repeatedly observed in the
context of voluntary action, it should also be noted here that
there is ongoing debate over whether or not this effect is specific
to voluntary action, or a property of causation more generally
(Buehner, 2012; Moore and Obhi, 2012). Nevertheless, the effect
reveals an intriguing reversal of the Human relationship between
time and causality.
As noted above, intentional binding is consistently found for
one’s own self-generated actions. However, it has also been sug-
gested that intentional binding occurs for other people’s move-
ments. For example, Wohlschläger et al. (2003) demonstrated that
observers perceived the interval between an experimenter’s move-
ment and its consequence as bound together in time, whereas there
was no intentional binding effect for observed machine-generated
movements. Assuming that observers attributed intentionality to
the experimenter’s but not to the machine’s movement, these
results suggest that intentional binding may be a property of
intentional causation in general rather than being restricted to
self-generated movements. This in turn would imply that the high-
level conceptualization of an observed movement in terms of the
underlying intention and causation shapes the lower-level percep-
tual processing of this stimulus. Whereas less is known about the
role of attributed causation in perception, the notion that the attri-
bution of mental states to a socially relevant stimulus might lead
to top-down modulation of perceptual information-processing is
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consistent with a small but growing body of findings in the social
perception literature (e.g., Teufel et al., 2009).
As indicated above, previous studies focusing on first- and
third-person intentional binding suggest that, at the perceptual
level, there is a distinction between intentional and unintentional
causation (but, see Buehner, 2012). The purpose of our study was
to add to this literature by exploring brain areas sensitive to the
interaction between intentionality and causality when observing
other people’s movements. In order to be able to address this ques-
tion, we extended the paradigm used by Wohlschläger et al. (2003)
to overcome two limitations. Firstly, the perceptual input used in
this study was not matched across the human and machine condi-
tions: in the former, participants saw the movements of the exper-
imenter’s gloved hand, while in the latter, they saw a disembodied
rubber hand being pulled down by a mechanical device. Such per-
ceptual differences preclude clear distinctions between top-down
and bottom-up influences on perception because differences in
bottom-up input are confounded with potential top-down effects.
In other words, it is impossible to tell whether perceptual dif-
ferences between conditions rather than the observer’s beliefs
regarding the intentionality or causality of the movements might
be responsible for the differences in perceived duration between
an observed movement and its outcome. A second caveat pertain-
ing to the Wohlschläger et al. study is that the key conditions were
distinguished not just according to intention but also the presence
of an agent: a human hand, unlike a rubber hand operated by a
machine, belongs to an agent. In this way, “intentionality” of the
stimulus was not systematically and exclusively manipulated.
Our paradigm ensured that (i) sensory stimulation was iden-
tical in the different attribution conditions, (ii) with respect to
mental-state attribution only intentionality was manipulated, and
(iii) we could, on a neuronal level, tease apart the individual and
combined effects of attributed intentionality and causation. Par-
ticipants viewed simple key press movements that caused a tone
outcome. Due to an elaborate deception procedure, observers
believed that these movements were either intentional or forced
upon the finger of the other person, i.e., unintentional. Crucially,
the stimuli and thus the bottom-up inputs were perceptually iden-
tical across conditions. Using this paradigm, we assessed binding
behaviorally with the interval estimation procedure (see Moore
and Obhi, 2012, for review). In order to be able to tease apart
the individual and combined roles of attributed intentionality and
causation using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI),
we included two additional non-causal conditions. That is, par-
ticipants not only viewed (apparent) intentional and (apparent)
unintentional causal movements (i.e., key presses that caused
tones), they also viewed (apparent) intentional and (apparent)
unintentional non-causal movements (i.e., key presses that did
not cause tones).
Behaviorally, we predicted that, if intentional binding for
observed movement does reflect the top-down role of attributed
intentionality, binding should be present in intentional but not
unintentional causal movements even when perceptual input was
identical (as it was in our paradigm). In order to explore the neu-
ronal correlates of the combined effect of attributed intentionality
and causation on perception of the finger movements, we chose
our ROIs based on two principles. First, in order to assess the extent
to which first- and third-person intentional binding are under-
pinned by at least partly overlapping processes, we selected our
ROIs based on previous fMRI investigations of first-person inten-
tional binding (for review, see Sperduti et al., 2011). In particular
we focused on the insula, supplementary motor areas, dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex, angular gyrus, and superior parietal cortex. In
addition, we added brain areas that have been implicated in social
perception and social cognition such as medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and superior temporal
sulcus (STS). This collection of regions has been speculated to be
a key network underpinning top-down effects on the perception
of socially relevant information (Teufel et al., 2010).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Nineteen participants took part in the study (mean age: 22 years;
16 females). Three participants were excluded from the analysis.
One participant failed to follow task instructions, one participant
did not believe the deception (revealed during the de-brief), and
one participant had uncorrected visual impairment (self-reported
by participant).
The experiment was approved by the National Research Ethics
Service (NRES). All participants gave informed consent prior to
the experiment.
BEHAVIORAL TASK
Design
We used a factorial design to systematically explore the effects
of intentionality (“intentional,” “unintentional”) and causality
(“causal,” “non-causal”) on movement perception and neural
activity.
Pre-scanning session
Participants attended a pre-scanning session in which they were
shown the experimental set-up and given practice with the par-
adigm. The paradigm depended upon participants believing that
they were watching a live webcam video-link of another person,
similar to a Skype conference, when in fact they were watching
pre-recorded videos (see Teufel et al., 2010, for rationale). We first
showed them a phoney video-link set-up in which there was a web-
cam in one of two adjacent rooms. A confederate was also sat in
this room. Participants were told that they would see this person –
via the “live” webcam video-link – performing simple manual key
press movements on a keyboard (see Figure 1). Participants also
briefly interacted with the apparatus that the confederate would
supposedly be using in the experiment. This apparatus consisted
of a keyboard on which a response key could be actively pressed
down or a harness attached to the button that could cause the
finger passively to move down. Participants made one active key
press and were also subjected to one passive key press.
Following this introduction, participants were taken to the
adjacent room where they completed practice trials in four dif-
ferent conditions. In two “causal” conditions participants watched
videos of the confederate’s finger moving down on the response
key. This movement caused a beep after one of three delays: 100,
400, 700 ms (following Moore et al., 2009). Participants were told
that the movement-beep interval randomly varied between 50 and
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FIGURE 1 | A video still showing an example stimulus used in the
experiment. The same set of videos was used in all four conditions
(intentional causal, intentional non-causal, unintentional causal,
unintentional non-causal). In the causal conditions the key press made in
the video caused a tone effect after a delay of 100, 400, or 700 ms. The only
difference in the two causal conditions was the description of the
movement and, consequently, the belief of the observer regarding its
intentionality. In these causal conditions participants estimated the duration
of this interval in milliseconds. In the non-causal conditions the key press
did not cause a tone effect. Again, the only difference in the non-causal
conditions was the description of the movement (intentional or
unintentional). In these non-causal conditions the participants had to press a
response key as soon as possible after they detected an asterisk appearing
at a random location on the video over the model’s hand (on 20% of trials).
950 ms. We employed an interval estimation paradigm to assess
the observers’ perception of the duration between the observed
movement and the tone. To make their judgment they were ini-
tially presented with the default number 500 ms and were told to
press a right key to increase this number (in 50 ms increments)
or a left key to decrease this number (in 50 ms increments). They
continued to increase or decrease the number on the screen rep-
resenting their interval estimate until they indicated by a button
press their final response. These two “causal” conditions differed
in terms of intention attribution: in one condition participants
were told that the confederate intentionally pressed the button, in
the other condition they were told that their finger was passively
moved by a motor. Crucially, the videos were identical in both
intentional and unintentional conditions. The only difference was
the description of the movement, and consequently the belief of
the observers regarding the intentionality of the observed button
press. Each video lasted 4 s and included a variable delay before
movement onset.
In two “non-causal” conditions participants watched videos
of the confederate’s finger moving but this time the movement
did not cause a beep outcome. These non-causal conditions were
included to allow us to investigate areas of brain activation that
were sensitive to the interaction between intentionality and causal-
ity. In order to maintain participants’ attention to the screen in
these conditions and to provide a measure of spatial attention
allocation, they were given a behavioral task that required them to
respond as quickly as possible to an asterisk appearing at a random
location on the video of the confederate’s hand on 20% of trials.
The only information participants were told about the asterisks
was that their appearance was random. These two “non-causal”
conditions also differed in terms of intention attribution: in one
condition participants were told that the confederate intention-
ally pressed the button, in the other condition they were told they
unintentionally pressed the button. Again, the videos were iden-
tical in both intentional and unintentional conditions. The only
difference was the description of the movement. Each video lasted
4 s and included a variable delay before movement onset.
Each of the four conditions consisted of 12 trials. In the“causal”
conditions (in which the movement caused the beep), there were
four trials per interval duration. Conditions were blocked by inten-
tionality. See Figure 1 for example video stimulus used in the
experiment.
Scanning session
When participants arrived for the scanning session they were told
that the same live webcam video-link was set-up as they had seen
in the pre-scanning session. However, they were not shown it this
time. In the scanner they completed the same four conditions
they had practiced in the pre-scanning session: intentional non-
causal; intentional causal; unintentional non-causal; unintentional
causal. Conditions were blocked by intentionality and there were
36 trials per condition. In the “causal” conditions (in which the
movement caused the beep), there were 12 trials per interval dura-
tion. All conditions were divided into blocks of six trials separated
by a period of rest during which participants fixated on a cross on
the screen for 12 s.
Prior to each condition the participants were told over the
intercom the nature of the movement (“intentional” or “unin-
tentional”) and whether or not the movement was causal. They
were also reminded of their task, i.e., either interval estimation or
detection of an asterisk.
The interval estimates in the causal conditions allowed us to
measure intentional binding. We predicted lower interval esti-
mates in the “intentional” condition vs. the “unintentional” con-
dition (following Wohlschläger et al., 2003). The asterisk response
task ensured that participants maintained their focus of attention
on the moving hand in the non-causal conditions.
FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING
We used a Siemens Trio scanner, operating at 3 T, with a 225 mm
field of view in the Wolfson Brain Imaging Centre, Cambridge.
In total, 300 volumes were acquired using a T2∗-weighted echo-
planar imaging sequence with 32 slices, acquired in descending
order with an oblique axial orientation, covering the whole brain.
Each slice was 3 mm thick with an inter-slice gap of 0.8 mm. A
repetition time of 2000 ms was used with echo time; TE= 30 ms,
flip angle= 78˚, and matrix size 64× 64.
Data were analyzed using statistical parametric mapping in
the SPM5 program (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk). Images were
realigned then spatially normalized to a standard template and
spatially smoothed with an isotropic three dimensional Gaussian
filter (8 mm full width at half-maximum). The time series in each
session were high-pass filtered (with cut-off frequency 1/120 Hz)
and serial autocorrelations were estimated using an AR(1) model.
Four experimental conditions (intentional non-causal, inten-
tional causal, unintentional non-causal, and unintentional causal)
were modeled using a box car function convolved with a canonical
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hemodynamic response. Conditions were specified as covariates
in a general linear model and the beta parameter estimated at each
voxel for each stimulus type, derived from the mean least-squares
fit of the model to the data. The responses to each condition were
compared to the fixation baseline, and each of these four con-
trasts was taken forward to a group analysis treating inter-subject
variability as a random effect.
Anatomically defined ROIs were selected based on previous
fMRI studies on sense of agency (see Sperduti et al., 2011 for
review). Specifically, we included: insula, supplementary motor
areas, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, angular gyrus, and superior
parietal cortex. In addition, we added the following ROIs: mPFC,
TPJ, and STS. This collection of regions is thought to be a key net-
work underpinning top-down effects on social perception (Teufel
et al., 2010). ROIs were specified using PickAtlas toolbox (Mald-
jian et al., 2003). We report significant interactions, corrected for
multiple comparisons (FDR p< 0.05 within the mask).
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL: INTENTIONAL BINDING
The intentional binding effect was measured by comparing mean
interval estimates in the “intentional causal” vs. “unintentional
causal” conditions (following Moore et al., 2009). A behavioral
study (N = 19) was conducted outside the scanner, using the same
procedure, to examine the effect of intention attribution on inten-
tional binding. The results showed that the mean interval estimate
in the intentional causal condition was significantly lower than in
the unintentional causal condition, t (19)= 2.22, p= 0.040 (two-
tailed). Based on the results of this initial behavioral result coupled
with Wohlschläger et al.’s (2003) study, one-tailed t -tests were
used for the analysis of intentional binding data collecting inside
the scanner. As predicted, the mean interval estimate in the inten-
tional causal condition (542 ms) was significantly lower than in the
unintentional causal condition (560 ms), t (15)= 1.94, p= 0.036
(one-tailed; see also Appendix). Although this effect is weaker than
that found in the prior behavioral study, it nevertheless shows that
intentional binding does hold for observed movements. This is
consistent with Wohlschläger et al.’s (2003) results.
BEHAVIORAL: REACTION TIMES AND ERROR RATES
We compared reaction times (RTs) to the asterisk in the two non-
causal conditions as differences in RTs may indicate more general
differences in the allocation of attention in the different inten-
tion attribution conditions. One participant failed to respond at
all to the asterisk in the intentional non-causal and was there-
fore excluded from this analysis. Although there was a numerical
decrease in reaction time in the intentional non-causal condition
(779 ms) vs. the unintentional non-causal condition (796 ms), this
difference was not statistically significant, t (14)= 1.73, p= 0.105
(two-tailed). This suggests that differences in the allocation of
attention cannot explain our key result.
In order to test further the possible confounding effect of atten-
tion, we examined the relationship between RTs and intentional
binding. This allowed us to determine whether or not differences
in intentional binding were related to (general) differences in
attention. We ran a correlation analysis on the difference in mean
interval estimates (intentional causal condition vs. unintentional
causal condition) and the difference in mean RTs (intentional
non-causal condition vs. unintentional non-causal condition). We
found no significant correlation, r(15)=−0.07, p= 0.80 (two-
tailed). This suggests that putative general differences in attention
(as measured by RTs) are unrelated to the intentional binding
effect.
Errors of commission (pressing the response button in the
absence of the asterisk) and omission (failing to press the response
button in the presence of the asterisk) were also calculated. Exclud-
ing the participant who failed to respond at all to the asterisk (see
above), there were no errors of commission and only two errors
of omission across the entire sample.
Taken together these results suggest that overall task perfor-
mance was high and that differences in attention and performance
are unlikely to explain our results.
FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING
Interaction between “intentionality” and “causality”
Intentional binding reflects a distinction, at the perceptual level,
between intentional and unintentional causation. Using fMRI we
investigated this distinction at the neural level. Specifically, we
explored activations sensitive to the interaction between intention-
ality and causality. ROI analyses highlighted the involvement of a
collection of brain regions reflecting this interaction (see Table 1).
These activations are shown in Figure 2 and the associated beta
values are shown in Figure 3. Superior parietal cortices and
motor cortices showed reduced activations for intentional causal
vs. intentional non-causal conditions (see Figures 2B,C,E,F and
3B,C,E,F). A more complex picture is found within the insula. Like
superior parietal and motor cortices, reduced activation was found
in right insula for intentional causal vs. intentional non-causal
conditions (see Figures 2D and 3D). On the other hand, acti-
vation in left posterior insula was increased in the unintentional
causal vs. unintentional non-causal conditions (see Figures 2G
and 3G). Finally, the left mid-insular showed the full cross-over
interaction, that is, reduced activations for intentional causal vs.
intentional non-causal conditions and increased activation in the
unintentional causal vs. unintentional non-causal conditions (see
Figures 2A and 3A). The specific directions of these effects are
scrutinized in the Section “Discussion.”
The main effect analysis for “intentionality” revealed no sig-
nificant activations in our regions of interest. The main effect of
Table 1 | Activations reflecting the interaction between factors of
“intentionality” and “causality” from the ROI analysis.
Area Side X Y Z Z -score
Mid-insula L −38 −5 21 4.37
Anterior insula R 34 16 14 4.06
Posterior insula L −40 −34 22 3.76
Superior parietal R 14 −41 60 4.29
Superior parietal L −18 −38 57 3.81
Primary motor cortex R 18 −28 53 4.10
Primary motor cortex L −16 −23 49 3.84
Talairach co-ordinates are reported.
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FIGURE 2 | Activations reflecting the interaction between factors of “intentionality” and “causality” from the ROI analysis in: left mid-insula (A); right
superior parietal cortex (B); right motor cortex (C); right anterior insula (D); left motor cortex (E); left superior parietal cortex (F); left posterior
insula (G).
“causality”was not analyzed owing to confounding task differences
between the causal and non-causal conditions.
It should be noted that, based on the neuroimaging lit-
erature in social perception, Teufel et al. (2010) speculated
about the involvement of mPFC, TPJ, and STS in mediating
these top-down effects on action perception. Therefore, our
failure to find significant activations in this network for
both the interaction and main effect analyses was surprising.
The possible reasons for this are considered in the Section
“Discussion.”
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DISCUSSION
Intentional binding refers to the subjective compression of time
between intentional movements and their causal consequences.
This effect has been most consistently observed for self-generated
movements. However, here we report evidence that intentional
binding also occurs for observed movements of another person;
this third-person intentional binding effect is consistent with pre-
vious findings (Wohlschläger et al., 2003). Moreover, using fMRI
we explored, at the neural level, the distinction between intentional
and unintentional causation that is thought to underlie inten-
tional binding and was hypothesized to be equally important for
binding of observed movements. Consistent with our predictions,
we found that a collection of brain regions thought to under-
lie intentional binding of one’s own actions was also sensitive to
the interaction between attributed intentionality and causality for
observed movements. Taken together, the findings indicate (i) that
third-person intentional binding is a top-down effect of higher-
order areas on lower-level perceptual areas, (ii) that intentional
binding relies on intentional causation but is not self-specific, and
(iii) that first- and third-person intentional binding are most likely
subserved by at least partly shared mechanisms. We discuss these
issues in more detail in the following sections.
TOP-DOWN EFFECTS ON SOCIAL PERCEPTION
As mentioned in the Section “Introduction,” previous work on
intentional binding for observed movements (e.g., Wohlschläger
et al., 2003) is undermined by limitations with the paradigm
used to study this phenomenon. Most problematic for the ques-
tion regarding the source of these effects is that perceptual input
differed in the two attribution conditions. This is a serious limi-
tation because it makes it impossible to separate bottom-up from
top-down effects on this task. In other words, any difference in
third-person intentional binding between the two attribution con-
ditions might be due to differences in the perceptual input rather
than an effect of top-down modulation by attributed intentionality
or agency.
In order to address this issue, we explored intentional binding
for observed movements using a more rigorous paradigm (Teufel
et al., 2010), in which sensory stimulation was identical in the dif-
ferent attribution conditions; the only difference between them
was whether observers believed that the movement they viewed
was generated intentionally or was forced upon the finger of the
other person. The fact that, even with this design, we found an
increase in third-person intentional binding when participants
attributed an intention to the movement compared to when they
FIGURE 3 | Continued
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FIGURE 3 | Beta values in each area for each condition (from left to right:
intentional non-causal, intentional causal, unintentional non-causal,
unintentional causal). Although they are intended for the purposes of
guidance only, these plots do suggest differences in the nature of the
interaction in these regions. The full cross-over interaction is only found in the
left mid-insula (A). An increase in activation for intentional non-causal vs.
intentional causal is found in right superior parietal (B), right motor cortex (C),
right anterior insula (D), left motor cortex (E), and left superior parietal cortex
(F). The only area showing an increase in activation for unintentional causal vs.
unintentional non-causal is left posterior insula (G).
believed it was unintentional indicates that this effect cannot be
due to differences in bottom-up input. Therefore, it is most likely
a result of a top-down modulatory influence of intention attri-
bution on those processes that underlie the perceptual binding of
observed actions and their consequences. This finding adds to a
number of recent studies indicating that the higher-level concep-
tualization of a stimulus in terms of the underlying mental states
can shape lower-level social information-processing.
In a recent proposal by Teufel et al. (2010), the authors specu-
lated about the neural implementation of such top-down modula-
tion of perceptual processing by the high-level conceptualization
of the stimulus in terms of mental states. In particular, they pro-
posed that the high-level component is localized in the theory of
mind network, including mPFC (e.g., Fletcher et al., 1995) and TPJ
(e.g., Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003), whereas perceptual processing
of biological motion and other social stimuli seems to primarily
take place in STS (e.g., Puce and Perrett, 2003). In neural terms,
top-down modulation of perception by mental-state attribution
would thus imply a feed-back loop between mPFC/TPJ and STS.
A recent study provided some support for this hypothesis with
respect to automatic imitation, the tendency of an observer to
automatically mimic the movement of another person (Wang et al.,
2011). Given that automatic imitation is closely linked to action
perception – in fact, in the proposal by Teufel et al. (2010), the
effects on imitation are a knock-on effect of the modulation of
perception – it is surprising that we did not detect a similar influ-
ence of the ToM network on perceptual processing of another
person’s movements in the current study. Even more surprising
is our failure to detect increased activation of these areas when
participants attributed an intention to the observed movements
compared to when they believed the movements were uninten-
tional. This lack of activation of crucial parts of the ToM network
is inconsistent with many previous reports and necessitates further
consideration in future studies.
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One possible reason for the lack of activation in this network is
that our paradigm was not sensitive enough to produce these acti-
vations. However, we think this is unlikely given the fact that (a)
we found significant activations in different brain regions for the
interaction analysis, and (b) there was a difference in intentional
binding in the intentional and unintentional conditions. Both
findings suggest that our manipulations were effective. In light
of this, we would suggest that this lack of activation may be linked
to important differences between previous studies on intention
attribution and the current one. First, whereas in previous stud-
ies the observed action was typically not followed by any obvious
outcome, in our study, both the intentional and the unintentional
movements were causal determinants of a tone. While this is largely
speculation, it might turn out that the brain processes movements
with and without obvious outcomes differently. A second differ-
ence relates to the fact that previous studies have used perceptually
different stimuli in the different conditions. Conceptually, these
stimulus differences are supposed to signal to the observer dif-
ferences in intentionality of the movements. In our study, the
differences in intentionality were not perceptually signaled but
were only present in the way in which the observer conceptualized
the stimuli (due to our deception procedure). A possible explana-
tion for a lack of activation in ToM related areas in our study might
be that attributed intentions that are signaled by the bottom-up
input are processed differently than attributed intentions that are
purely set-up by the observer’s belief system. A more controversial
interpretation of previous studies is that because the intention con-
veyed by a stimulus and the perceptual properties of the stimulus
were confounded, it might be that increased activation in mPFC,
TPJ, and STS directly reflect differences in perceptual processing
rather than reflecting the attribution of intentions.
THE NEUROCOGNITIVE BASIS OF INTENTIONAL BINDING, AGENT
CAUSATION, AND LACK OF SELF-SPECIFICITY
Although intentional binding is a widely used implicit measure of
sense of agency, there is, nevertheless, an ongoing debate about
what processes intentional binding reflects (Moore and Obhi,
2012). For example, some have suggested that intentional binding
is not a specific property of agent causation, but is instead a prop-
erty of any causal relationship. Indeed, a number of studies have
demonstrated the importance of causality for intentional bind-
ing (Buehner and Humphreys, 2009; Moore et al., 2009; Buehner,
2012). The current findings, although not ruling out the role of
causality, do at least suggest that the presence of intentionality
augments binding. These results also suggest that whilst bind-
ing is likely to be augmented for intentional agent causation,
this effect is not self-specific. That is, intentional binding is not
only found for one’s own self-generated movements but instead
appears to be a more general property of agent causation. This
raises important questions regarding the neurocognitive processes
supporting binding and whether they are the same for first-person
and third-person binding.
It has been suggested that sensorimotor processes play a central
role in intentional binding (Haggard et al., 2002). This is based on
observations that intentional binding is most consistently found
for voluntary actions (i.e., those which necessarily engage senso-
rimotor processes; see Moore and Obhi, 2012, for a review). This
assumption is potentially undermined by our findings,which show
intentional binding occurs when people are passively observing
another person move. Here, the motor system of the observer is
not overtly engaged.
One possible explanation for this finding is that sensorimo-
tor information is not essential for the intentional binding effect.
Indeed, this has been demonstrated by a number of studies show-
ing that binding can occur in the absence of voluntary movement.
For example, by modifying intentional content prior to a passive
movement (Moore et al., 2009) or by implying self-causation prior
to a passive movement (Dogge et al., 2011), one can modulate the
magnitude of binding. This is consistent with a recent theoretical
framework highlighting the contribution (and optimal integra-
tion) of various cues to sense of agency, of which sensorimotor
information is just one (e.g., Moore and Fletcher, 2012).
Another possible explanation is that, although the sensorimo-
tor system is not overtly engaged during action observation, it is
nevertheless covertly activated. This could generate the binding
effect for observed movements. Our fMRI data offer indirect sup-
port for this hypothesis. We selected a number of ROIs based on
regions commonly involved in the sense of agency of one’s own
overt actions. In the present study we found that a number of
these regions were also involved in discriminating between inten-
tional and unintentional causation when observing someone else
move, including superior parietal cortices, the insula, and primary
motor cortices. The involvement of these regions, in particular
the primary motor cortices, suggests that sensorimotor processes
engaged when performing an action also contribute to agency pro-
cessing when observing an action. This hypothesis is supported by
a large body of research highlighting the tight link between sys-
tems involved in action execution and action observation. For
example, when observing someone else move there is an auto-
matic tendency to imitate these movements (Brass et al., 2001).
Moreover, this tendency is influenced by higher-level mental-state
attributions. For example, Wang et al. (2011) found that automatic
imitation was enhanced during direct eye contact, and Liepelt
et al. (2008) found that it was enhanced when people were led
to believe the movements they were seeing were intentional. This
latter study is particularly relevant and offers a plausible explana-
tion for our finding of increased binding when people were led
to believe the action was intentional: this instruction would have
increased covert sensorimotor activity during action observation.
PATTERNS OF ACTIVATION: THE ROLE OF PREDICTION ERROR?
There was an intriguing pattern of activation in those regions
reflecting the distinction between intentional and unintentional
causation (see Figure 3). The interactions revealed a relative
increase in activity in both unintentional causal and intentional
non-causal conditions. We can only offer a speculative account of
what this may mean. One possibility is that these activations are
linked to prediction error. Central to this proposal is the notion
that action and goal/outcome representations are inextricably
linked. According to so-called “response-outcome” (R-O) theories
of intentional action (Thorndike, 1931; Dickinson and Balleine,
1993, 1994; de Wit and Dickinson, 2009), once R-O associations
have been established, thoughts about actions prior to movement
automatically trigger thoughts about associated outcomes. These
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outcomes are then evaluated with respect to goals and the appro-
priate response is selected. Based on the assumption of a shared
network for action generation and action perception, and in line
with R-O theories, we would suggest that when participants were
led to believe they were watching an intentional action, this would
first activate the shared action network, which in turn automati-
cally activates an outcome representation. The higher activity for
intentional non-causal action vs. intentional causal action may
represent error-related increases in activation linked to the absence
of an expected effect. Regions that appear to be particularly sensi-
tive to this include: superior parietal cortex, the motor cortex, and
the right insula. Following this same logic, the representation of
unintentional action should not activate goal/outcome represen-
tations. If this were the case then when one is led to believe they
are watching an unintentional action, this would fail to activate
goal/outcome representations. The higher activity for uninten-
tional causal action vs. unintentional non-causal action may also
be error-related activation linked to the presence of an unexpected
effect. The single region that is particularly sensitive to this is the
left posterior insula.
Although speculative, this prediction error hypothesis receives
support from previous studies which demonstrate the involve-
ment of these regions in outcome prediction and/or the encoding
of prediction error. For example, it is well established that the
parietal lobe is involved in sensorimotor prediction (Andersen
and Buneo, 2002; Blakemore and Sirigu, 2003). Furthermore,
it has been shown activity within superior parietal regions is
higher during unpredictable externally produced tactile stimula-
tion compared with predictable self-produced tactile stimulation
(Blakemore et al., 1998). The insula, another core region high-
lighted by our analyses, is also commonly activated when predic-
tions are violated (Preuschoff et al., 2008; Bossaerts, 2010). Of
particular relevance is the suggestion that performance monitor-
ing – detecting mismatches between goals and outcomes – is one of
the primary functions of the insula (and in particular, the anterior
insula; Ullsperger et al., 2010).
CONCLUSION
In summary, our findings support a number of conclusions.
First, the fact that intentional binding not only holds for self-
generated but also for observed movements suggests that, although
it may be a property of agent causation, it is not self-specific.
Second, we were able to establish the presence of intentional
binding for observed movements in the absence of percep-
tual differences between intentional and unintentional condi-
tion. This represents an important methodological advance.
Finally, our fMRI data reveal a collection of regions whose activ-
ity reflects the interaction between intentionality and causal-
ity, something that lies at the heart of the intentional binding
effect. These regions have also been implicated in the sense of
agency over one’s own movements. In light of these observa-
tions we have suggested that common mechanisms may underpin
the experience of self-agency and the attribution of agency to
others.
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APPENDIX
Table A1 | Average interval estimate (ms) for each interval length in
the intentional causal and unintentional causal conditions.
100 ms 400 ms 700 ms
Intentional causal 354 (26) 569 (21) 705 (22)
Unintentional causal 348 (26) 596 (26) 739 (22)
SEM in parentheses.
A 2 (intentionality: intentional causal/unintentional causal)× 3 (interval length:
100/400/700 ms) repeated measures ANOVA conducted on these data (Table A1)
shows a near-significant main effect of “intentionality,” F(1, 15)=3.75, p=0.072,
a significant main effect of “interval length,” F(2, 30)=137.73, p<0.001, and no
significant interaction between these factors, F(2, 30)=2.01, p=0.15.
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